The long-standing territorial dispute over Lipulekh, a strategically significant pass nestled in the Himalayas, continues to be a persistent point of contention, casting a shadow over Nepal’s sovereignty and its relations with its two powerful neighbours, India and China. Nepal has, on multiple occasions, formally communicated its traditional territorial claims to both New Delhi and Beijing, urging them to acknowledge and respect its historical assertions in the Kalapani region. However, these appeals appear to have fallen on deaf ears, with neither India nor China demonstrating a serious inclination to address Nepal’s concerns.
India, for its part, firmly asserts that border trade with China via the Lipulekh pass has been an ongoing practice for decades. New Delhi maintains that Nepal’s claims are “neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence.” This stance has been a consistent roadblock in resolving the dispute.
China, on the other hand, has adopted a more detached approach, characterizing the Lipulekh issue as a “bilateral matter” strictly between Nepal and India. This position effectively sidelines Nepal’s involvement and suggests a reluctance to engage directly in mediating or acknowledging Nepal’s claims.
A Resurgence of the Dispute
The Lipulekh controversy has once again intensified following reports indicating that border trade between India and China through the pass is slated to resume in June, after a prolonged six-year hiatus. This development has reignited concerns within Nepal, highlighting the precarious position of the nation situated between two rapidly growing global powers.
The prevailing situation suggests that both India and China are, in essence, disregarding Nepal’s legitimate concerns. India’s outright dismissal of Nepal’s claims, despite the availability of substantial historical evidence supporting Nepal’s position, is particularly troubling. While India has expressed openness to “constructive interaction” on boundary matters, its categorical rejection of Nepal’s Lipulekh claims appears to undermine any genuine path towards dispute resolution.
Meanwhile, China’s strategy seems to be geared towards capitalizing on the existing status quo, while simultaneously evading any responsibility for facilitating a resolution to the dispute. As previously noted, when India and China reached an understanding in principle to reopen Lipulekh for bilateral trade, a simple inclusion of a clause such as “in consultations with Nepal” would have been a significant diplomatic gesture.
The Importance of Diplomatic Symbolism
Such symbolic gestures are of paramount importance in international diplomacy, especially for smaller nations like Nepal that often grapple with the fear of their sovereignty being undermined by larger powers. Acknowledging Nepal’s concerns would have demonstrated that these burgeoning global powers are responsible international actors, mindful of the interests of their smaller neighbours as they pursue their own development and prosperity.
Nepal’s Path Forward
The question then arises: what steps should Nepal’s government take in this complex geopolitical landscape? The newly formed Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) government faces a critical imperative to consistently and publicly reaffirm Nepal’s established position on the Lipulekh issue. However, this alone is insufficient.
Historically, Nepal has dispatched numerous diplomatic notes to both India and China concerning this matter. The current RSP government must elevate the dialogue to the highest diplomatic echelons in both New Delhi and Beijing.
A particularly significant diplomatic achievement for the new Prime Minister, Balendra Shah, and the RSP would be to persuade New Delhi to consider a “tripartite” trade agreement for Lipulekh, rather than a strictly “bilateral” one between India and China. This would be a major coup, especially given China’s prior indication of readiness to accept a bilateral understanding between Nepal and India concerning Lipulekh.
While India might harbour reservations about setting a precedent with such a concession, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter its broader strategic calculus concerning its border with China. Past governments, particularly those led by KP Oli, were perceived as having an anti-India bias, which may have hindered India’s willingness to make such concessions. The Shah government, by contrast, has the advantage of starting with a clean slate, potentially creating a more conducive environment for diplomatic breakthroughs.
