Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Crossroads: A Power Grab or Democratic Reform?
Zimbabwe stands at a critical juncture, facing a significant constitutional overhaul proposed by the ruling Zanu PF party. The Constitution Amendment Bill 3, as it is known, is poised to reshape the nation’s legal and political landscape, with critics arguing it is a strategic move to centralise power and extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tenure. While the government maintains the Bill aims to bolster constitutional governance and align Zimbabwe with international best practices, a closer examination reveals a complex web of proposed changes that could profoundly impact the independence of key state institutions.
The proposed amendments represent the most substantial restructuring of Zimbabwe’s legal framework since the adoption of the 2013 constitution. Observers suggest that President Mnangagwa emerges as the principal beneficiary of nearly every proposed clause. Capitalising on Zanu PF’s substantial two-thirds majority in Parliament, the administration intends to bypass a national referendum, a move that has drawn stern warnings from legal watchdog Veritas. They contend that such an omission could contravene the foundational principles of the existing constitution.
Extending Presidential and Parliamentary Terms: A Matter of Years, or Power?
At the core of Amendment Bill 3 lies a proposal to extend the terms of both the President and Parliament by two years. Under the current 2013 constitution, President Mnangagwa’s term is slated to conclude in 2028. However, Clause 4 of the new bill seeks to push this expiration date to 2030. This alteration is viewed by many not as a mere administrative adjustment, but as a direct challenge to the constitutional safeguards designed to prevent perpetual rule.
Legal experts, including Veritas, have raised a significant “red-flag” concerning Section 328(7) of the constitution. This specific provision stipulates that any amendment extending a term limit cannot be applied to the individual currently occupying that office. For President Mnangagwa to legally remain in office until 2030 under this proposed extension, the government would need to either override or amend Section 328(7). Such a significant change, according to constitutional scholars, necessitates public approval through a national referendum. The government’s insistence on circumventing this public consultation process has led to accusations of selectively manipulating the law to benefit the incumbent president. Critics argue that the justifications provided for this extension are “unconvincing” and fail to acknowledge the primary objective: elongating the current president’s time in power.
The Presidency by Parliament: A Shift from Popular Will
Perhaps the most radical proposed shift within Amendment Bill 3 is the potential removal of citizens’ right to directly elect their president. Clause 3 outlines a plan for the president to be elected by Parliament, rather than through a general popular vote. Given Zanu PF’s current two-thirds majority in the legislature, analysts widely anticipate that the next president would inevitably emerge from the ruling party, further insulating the executive from the direct mandate of the electorate. This transition from a direct popular vote to a parliamentary selection process effectively redefines the presidency, potentially transforming it into a position determined by party loyalty and legislative manoeuvring. For President Mnangagwa, this mechanism could offer a more predictable path to retaining power, by eliminating the inherent unpredictability of a national election.
Judicial and Prosecutorial Independence Under Threat
The Bill also seeks to dismantle the transparent mechanisms currently in place for appointing the nation’s top legal officers. Critics describe the proposed changes as effectively reducing the judiciary and the chief prosecutor to “presidential hirelings.” Clause 15 proposes that all judges, from the Chief Justice downwards, would be appointed by the President following “consultation” with the Judicial Service Commission.
This would effectively abolish the existing requirements for public nominations and televised interviews, thereby eliminating any semblance of transparency in the judicial appointment process. Veritas warns that if judges are appointed at the “whim of the President,” public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the courts could be severely undermined.
Furthermore, Clause 20 grants the President sole discretion to appoint the Prosecutor-General without requiring any external advice. This concentration of power is viewed as a direct threat to the rule of law. The Prosecutor-General plays a crucial role in deciding who is prosecuted for criminal offences, and a lack of independence in this office could hinder the ability to investigate or prosecute members of the executive branch.
Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction: A Question of Authority
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is also facing potential alterations. Clause 14 proposes to empower the court to grant itself leave to appeal on any matter it deems to be of “general public importance.” Experts describe this as a “dangerous” power grab, which could allow the court to unilaterally define its own jurisdiction, potentially infringing upon the Supreme Court’s established role as the final court of appeal.
Parliamentarians’ Extended Terms and Senatorial Appointments
While the President is identified as the primary beneficiary, current members of Parliament and the Senate also stand to gain from the proposed amendments. Their terms would be extended from five to seven years, ensuring their continued tenure until 2030 without the need to face the electorate in 2028. However, this benefit comes at the potential cost of the separation of powers. Clause 8 grants the President the authority to appoint ten Senators based on their “professional skills.” Critics point out that this provision echoes tactics from the Robert Mugabe era, where similar powers were used to appoint loyalists. Veritas has noted that this amendment could indirectly enable the President to circumvent the current limit on cabinet ministers appointed from outside Parliament. By appointing potential ministers as senators first, the President could potentially fill his cabinet with unelected loyalists who are personally indebted to him.
Independent Commissions: Stripped of Power and Purpose
If the President and his party are the winners in this constitutional reconfiguration, independent commissions appear to be the clear “immediate casualties.” The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is slated to be stripped of its core functions, including voter registration, maintaining the voters’ roll, and delimiting electoral boundaries.
Under Clause 2, the responsibility for voter registration would revert to the registrar-general, a civil servant who operates under the direct political control of the President through his ministers. This development has ignited fears of potential political manipulation, particularly given past accusations against the registrar-general’s office for alleged mismanagement of voters’ rolls between 1980 and 2013.
Furthermore, a new “Zimbabwe Electoral Delimitation Commission” would be established to oversee constituency boundaries. All members of this commission would be appointed by the President and serve at his discretion, meaning it would lack even the “notional independence” currently possessed by ZEC.
Social and Human Rights Protections: Reassigned or Abolished
Provisions for social and human rights protections are also facing significant changes. Clauses 18 and 19 propose the abolition of the Zimbabwe Gender Commission, with its functions being transferred to the broader Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission. Women’s rights organisations have voiced strong opposition to this move, arguing that a specialised commission is essential for addressing the pervasive issue of gender-based violence in the country.
Similarly, Clause 22 formally abolishes the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. While this commission legally ceased to exist in 2023, it had continued to receive government funding.
Traditional Leaders and the Military: Political Alignment and Shifting Duties
The Bill also seeks to formalise the political role of traditional leaders. The current constitution mandates that chiefs remain non-partisan. Clause 21 proposes to remove this requirement, allowing traditional leaders to officially join political parties. This is widely interpreted as a strategy for Zanu PF to continue leveraging chiefs to influence their subjects’ support for the ruling party in rural areas. Critics argue that assuming party-political roles would compromise the impartiality required for chiefs to preside over local courts and manage land allocation.
Regarding the military, Clause 16 proposes to remove the “separate function” of the Defence Forces to uphold the Constitution. Instead, the clause would state that protecting the people must be done “in accordance with” the constitution. While some analysts suggest this change may not significantly alter their role, others believe it subtly diminishes the military’s duty to act as a constitutional watchdog.
A Scathing Rejection from Watchdogs
The government’s memorandum accompanying the Bill asserts that these changes will “strengthen democratic structures.” However, legal watchdogs have offered a scathing assessment. Veritas has declared that “the Bill has nothing to recommend it” and should be rejected in its entirety by Parliament. The watchdog warns that rather than aligning Zimbabwe with “progressive” nations, these amendments appear to bring the country’s system into line with authoritarian regimes found in countries such as the Central African Republic, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea – nations not typically associated with stability or exemplary governance.
As Amendment Bill 3 progresses towards Parliament, the primary beneficiary remains evident: President Mnangagwa. Through proposed term extensions, the potential end of direct presidential elections, and the systematic dismantling of independent oversight bodies, these changes represent a comprehensive consolidation of executive power. Even if passed by the Zanu PF-dominated legislature, the amendments are highly likely to face formidable legal challenges, grounded in arguments that they violate the fundamental values and the core structure of Zimbabwe’s constitution.
