War’s Three-Year Toll: Sudan’s Local Violence Becomes Systemic

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A Humanitarian Catastrophe and the Failure of International Accountability

Sudan is currently facing a humanitarian catastrophe of staggering proportions. The people who bear the heaviest burden of this crisis remain largely unrecognized by the international community. In Darfur, more than three million internally displaced people have spent over 23 years caught between violence and abandonment. Their lives are shaped by fear, hunger, and the constant uncertainty of when they will be forced to flee again. Families that once had homes, farms, livelihoods, and communities now survive in makeshift shelters, carrying memories of loved ones lost to ethnically targeted attacks and the trauma of being repeatedly displaced from their homes.

These individuals have shown extraordinary resilience in the face of unimaginable hardship, but resilience should not be mistaken for acceptance of the status quo. They deserve safety, dignity, and the opportunity to rebuild their lives. However, the world’s attention has drifted, meaningful protection has not materialized, and the institutions entrusted with delivering justice have faced profound constraints in responding to the scale of atrocities committed in Darfur.

Despite its mandate and past efforts, the ICC has been operating under significant political, operational, and access-related challenges that no single institution can overcome alone. It cannot and should not be expected to shoulder this mandate alone. Ensuring accountability and safeguarding the rights of Darfur’s displaced communities require sustained international engagement, genuine political will, and coordinated support.

The post–World War II experience demonstrates that meaningful accountability is most effective after the cessation of hostilities, when institutions can function and evidence can be preserved systematically. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were possible precisely because the war had ended and the international community could enforce justice without the constraints of an active conflict. In contrast, the Darfur conflict has faced profound obstacles because attempts to pursue justice, most notably through the International Criminal Court (ICC), were initiated during an ongoing, fragmented war.

Insecurity, political fragmentation, and the absence of a cooperative state authority have repeatedly obstructed investigations, witness protection, and the enforcement of arrest warrants. This stands in stark contrast to the early 1990s, when UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali advanced a robust peace-enforcement agenda, enabling the UN to impose ceasefires and create conditions conducive to accountability in conflicts such as those in Cambodia and Mozambique. However, in Sudan, the absence of a sustained ceasefire has prevented such progress. A temporary cessation of hostilities could facilitate credible accountability by granting access to affected regions, ensuring the protection of survivors, and allowing judicial mechanisms to function without fear of intimidation.

The Legacy of Authoritarian Rule and the Rise of Impunity

Sudan has been governed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) since the 1989 military coup, consolidating a highly centralized and militarized political order that has led to prolonged conflicts in Southern Sudan, Blue Nile, and Darfur. Over the subsequent three decades, state authorities relied on coercive security structures and counterinsurgency strategies that systematically targeted civilian populations, contributing to large-scale displacement and widespread human rights violations documented by the Human Rights report in 2004.

In response to the mass atrocities committed in Darfur, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for five senior officials, including former President Omar al-Bashir. However, the international community’s inability to secure cooperation from Sudanese authorities and regional actors has prevented the enforcement of these warrants, thereby limiting the court’s capacity to advance accountability in Sudan.

The December 2018 revolution marked the conclusion of three decades of authoritarian governance under the National Congress Party (NCP), a brief opportunity for the democratic transformation of a hybrid transitional government established pursuant to the 2019 Constitutional Declaration. However, the transition remained structurally fragile and was ultimately derailed by the October 2021 coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This rupture dismantled the civilian-military partnership and intensified competition among armed elites, contributing directly to the outbreak of the war on 15 April 2023.

The Spread of Atrocity Crimes and Regional Implications

The atrocities unfolding in Sudan are no longer geographically contained within Darfur; they have expanded outwards, engulfing vast regions of the country with the same brutal logic and tactics that defined earlier waves of violence. What began as targeted campaigns against Black African communities in Darfur has now spread to Khartoum, Omdurman, Gezira, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, replicating the same patterns of mass rape, starvation, forced displacement, and deliberate destruction of civilian life.

This geographic expansion underscores a critical truth: the violence in Sudan is neither episodic nor localized. It is a systemic, racialized, and militarized project that has metastasized across the country, feeding on the lives and bodies of Sudanese people far beyond Darfur’s borders and is now a part of the national identity.

The Need for a Special Court for Sudan

The limitations of the International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) have become increasingly evident: the crime of aggression has not been investigated despite clear internal and external factors; serious violations against children remain unaddressed; and minimal attention is paid to sexual and gender-based crimes. The court has only prosecuted four villages compared to the number of villages attacked, which are integral to the violence in Darfur and beyond and are significantly underrepresented in the court’s prosecutorial strategy.

Given the scale and geographic spread of atrocity crimes across Sudan, the UN Security Council must expand its mandate to cover the entire country, enabling the establishment of a special court mechanism with the legitimacy and technical expertise required to address the full spectrum of violations in Sudan. Such a tribunal must possess jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed since April 2023, ensuring that no region or community is excluded from seeking justice for these crimes.

Conclusion: A Call for Universal Justice

The Sudanese experience makes it unmistakably clear that power and authority can no longer be invoked to excuse atrocity crimes. The crime of aggression, long recognized as the catalyst that enables genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, has become one of the most destructive forces of this century. Its consequences are evident in the millions of civilians killed by heavy military machinery, the environmental devastation of scorched-earth campaigns, artisanal gold mining using dangerous chemicals, and the systematic use of women’s bodies as instruments of war.

A just international order cannot rely on selective accountability. Moral justice requires a universal commitment to the safety, dignity, and humanity of the Sudanese people. This commitment forms the ethical foundation of international law: when justice is uneven, institutions lose legitimacy; when it is applied with integrity, it becomes the highest expression of our shared civilization. Therefore, Sudan’s crisis demands more than mere condemnation. It requires a renewed dedication to the principles first articulated at Nuremberg and reconfirmed in the Rome Statute: confronting aggression, protecting the vulnerable, and insisting on accountability so that justice becomes a universal ethic rather than a privilege reserved for a few.

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